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Wallerstein: An American Dilemma of the 21st Century?

Immanuel Wallerstein
An American Dilemma of the 21st Century?

Abstracts
In 1941, Henry Luce proclaimed the twentieth century the
American Century. And in 1944, Gunnar Myrdal wrote of the
American dilemma, the discrepancy between its values and
the actual treatment of Black Americans. In the post-1945 period,
the need of a hegemonic United States to project a positive world
image led to major improvements in the position of Black
Americans – an improvement however primarily for educated
elites and much less for the Black working-class strata.
In the period since 1970, U.S. power has been on the decline,
which has caused increased internal tensions in the U.S. This
intersects with the structural crisis of the world-system,
manifesting itself as an increasingly chaotic world in which there
is taking place a world political struggle between the forces
of the spirit of Davos and the forces of the spirit of Porto
Alegre over the nature of the new world-system that will be
constructed.
One major question is how the U.S. will react to its decline,
the new American dilemma, and how that will affect its ability
to deal with the old (Myrdal) American dilemma.

Un Dilema Americano para el Siglo XXI?
En 1941 Henry Luce proclamó al Siglo XX como el Siglo
Americano. En 1944 Gunnar Myrdal escribió el Dilema
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Americano, reﬁriendose a la situación de los negros en Estados Unidos. En el periodo posterior
a 1945, la necesidad de aﬁrmar la hegemonía americana con una imagen positiva, llevo a
mejorar la situación de los Negros pero básicamente de las elitesy no de los trabajadores.
Desde 1970, los Estados Unidos empezaron a declinar, lo cual condujo a tensiones internas
que se unen a la crisis estructural mundial, en una situación de caos en el que las fuerzas
defensoras del espiritu de Davos se oponen a las de Porto Alegre en deﬁnir la el sistema
mundial a construir.
Una cuestión importante es como Estados Unidos reaccionará a su propio declive, el nuevo
Dilema Americano y como ello afectará a la forma de resolver el anterior, el de Gunnar Myrdal.

Un dilemme américain du XXIe siècle?
En 1941, Henry Luce a proclamé le XXe siècle le siècle américain. Et en 1944, Gunnar Myrdal
écrivait un livre sur le dilemme américain, c’est-à-dire, la divergence entre les valeurs américaines
et le traitement réel des Noirs. Dans la période après 1945, les Etats-Unis, pouvoir hégémonique,
s’est senti la nécessité de projeter un image mondial très positif, ce qui l’amenait à améliorer
d’une façon sérieuse la position des Noirs. Cette amélioration pourtant eut un impact surtout
sur la place des élites noirs et assez peu sur la position des strates ouvrières noires.
Depuis 1970, la puissance des Etats-Unis se trouve en déclin, ce qui aboutissait à un
accroissement des tensions internes aux Etats-Unis. Ceci eut lieu en même temps qu’il se
passe une crise structurelle du système-monde. Cette crise se manifeste par un monde toujours
plus chaotique et en résulte une lutte politique mondiale entre les forces de l’esprit de Davos
et les forces de l’esprit de Porto Alegre, une lutte autour de la conception du nouveau systèmemonde qui est en train de se construire.
Une question actuelle principale est comment les Etats-Unis vont réagir à son déclin, ce
qui est le nouveau dilemme américain, et comment cela va avoir impact sur sa capacité de
traiter le vieux dilemme (myrdalien) américain.

An American Dilemma of the 21st Century?
In 1941, Henry Luce proclaimed the twentieth century the American Century.
He was certainly not wrong. It was the century in which the United States
became the dominant force in world production and the hegemonic power
of the world-system. In 1944, Gunnar Myrdal published An American Dilemma,
in which he argued that the basic values of the Enlightenment proclaimed in
the United States were in persistent conﬂict with the actual treatment accorded
Black Americans (then called Negroes). The two realities (that of Luce and
that of Myrdal) interwove in the second half of the twentieth century. The
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/swb/vol1/iss1/1
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geocultural constraints of being a hegemonic power – speciﬁcally, the need
to project a world image as the standard-bearer of the “free world” – was a
major factor in inducing the United States government to make some
important changes in the position of Blacks in American society, notably
President Truman’s executive order in 1948 desegregating the armed forces
and the 1954 decision of the Supreme Court that declared segregation
unconstitutional. These decisions were critical elements in the process that
subsequently resulted in a breakdown of many social barriers for educated,
middle-class Blacks.
In this ﬁrst decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century, it seems clear that there will
not be a second American century. We are living amidst the decline of American
power. As for Myrdal’s American dilemma, it seems clear that, although there
were notable improvements in the modes in which racism was played out
in the United States since the time that Myrdal wrote, the basic discordance
of American values and American realities remain unresolved. There is in
addition a new American dilemma – how to cope with this decline. The social
choices the U.S. makes in its response to the decline of American power will
both be conditioned by and in turn affect dramatically the still enduring other
American dilemma that Myrdal described.
The decline of the hegemony of the United States is not the result of some
errors in the policies of successive U.S. governments. It is the normal
consequence of the operations of the modern world-system, in which the
moments of true hegemony are not, and cannot be, long-lasting. Hegemonic
power self-destructs. Its roots are a transitory situation of extraordinary
economic advantage that results in political, military, and cultural dominance
in the world-system. But extraordinary economic advantage is like any
monopoly. Its secrets can be learned and copied, and latecomers are able to
undercut the leader which has various kinds of ﬁxed charges it is paying
down, and which latecomers need not assume. In addition, politico-military
leadership is undercut by the costs of maintaining it. Peaks of hegemony tend
to last 25–50 years at most. For the United States, the period of true hegemony
was quite short. I date it as going from 1945 to circa 1970.
The period 1970–2001 was one in which successive U.S. presidents
reacted to the decline that was beginning by seeking to slow down its pace
with a series of speciﬁc and new policies: “partnership” for close allies;
efforts to ensure non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; and substitution of
the rhetoric and policies of “globalization” for the rhetoric and policies of
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2006
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“developmentalism.” This set of policies was designed to maintain the
maximum degree possible of the power and authority of the U.S., even if it
were less than that of the previous period. The U.S. governments were in fact
moderately successful in this objective.1
But, there were some Americans for whom the success was far too
modest, and these policies were deﬁned instead as a failure. They are those
we now call neo-conservatives. This group considered the origins of the
decline, which they admitted as a reality, to be not at all structural (and
therefore inevitable) but merely the consequence of weaknesses displayed
by the presidential leadership. In 2001, taking advantage of the attack of
September 11, this group persuaded President George W. Bush to implement
a quite different policy, one that one might call macho aggressive unilateralism.
The logic of this alternative policy was that a show of unilateral and massive
force – for example, by invading Iraq, destituting Saddam Hussein, and then
maintaining with ease a U.S.-deﬁned order in the “greater Middle East” –
would have the geopolitical consequence of reversing totally the decline. It
was believed that such initiatives, which they had not doubt would succeed
totally, would intimidate the allies (particularly, western Europe) into
abandoning all efforts to pursue an independent geopolitical strategy, frighten
those middle powers which were thinking of obtaining nuclear weapons
(particularly, North Korea and Iran) and inducing them to renounce such
plans, and bamboozling all other countries (particularly in the Middle East)
to align themselves unreservedly with the United States.
As has since become obvious to almost everyone, this new policy was a
complete ﬁasco. Western Europe, far from being intimidated, took considerable
public distance from the United States. North Korea and Iran did not abandon
but speeded up their nuclear programs. And the Middle Eastern states,
even those most dependent upon the U.S., became warier than ever of
U.S. pressures. Furthermore, the U.S. has been undergoing what will be
historically seen as an actual military defeat in Iraq. Despite all its military
hardware and technical prowess, the U.S. proved to be quite incapable of
wiping out the Iraqi resistance. And the governmental structure it installed
in the place of that of Saddam Hussein has shown itself to be neither able to
control the situation nor a likely long-term ally of U.S. interests.
1
I have spelled out what happened between 1945–1970 and then 1970–2001 in many
places. See, for example, Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World, New
York: New Press, 2004.
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If one looks then at what happened concerning the American dilemma
described by Myrdal, we see that the period 1945–1970 was one of great
internal struggle in the United States aimed both at dismantling the legal
apparatuses that institutionalized racism and at undermining the societal
legitimacy of racist rhetoric. On the legal-institutional front, the Supreme
Court decision of 1954 was followed by the Civil Rights Act of 1967 as well as
the initiation of programs of afﬁrmative action, both by the U.S. government
and by all manner of other institutions. And these changes did have the effect
of delegitimating the old openly racist rhetoric that was still pervasive and
widely accepted at the end of the Second World War. This was the period of
strong Black social movements (SCLC, SNCC, Black Power) and strong Black
movement heroes (Martin Luther King, Malcolm X).
In the period 1970–2001, many Black politicians, professionals, and business
persons were able to take advantage of these changes and become installed
in high positions in major institutions (the armed forces, the three branches
of government, the universities, the corporate structures). But, at the base,
most Blacks remained excluded from employment, continued to lead de facto
segregated lives, and were incarcerated disproportionately in prisons and
consequently deprived of voting rights.
Since this was also a period that saw increased unemployment in general,
and a decline in real income for the U.S. working classes, there also set in
a serious social reaction against both what was described as “reverse
discrimination” (that is, the effect of afﬁrmative action on White workers)
and also the inﬂux of undocumented workers (who were principally Latin@s).
In short, the gains in rhetoric were beginning to recede partially, and the legal
rights were watered down in many ways.
One of the social expressions of this reaction was the politicization of many
White Christian evangelicals, who formed movements that challenged the
egalitarian and Enlightenment rhetoric that had underlain many of the legalinstitutional and rhetorical gains of Blacks and other “minorities” as well as
of women which these groups had won in the period of U.S. hegemony. The
so-called Christian right used the political tactic of entering into the twoparty structure of U.S. politics and became a major force within the Republican
Party. This turned out to be extremely efﬁcacious.
The changes in the relative power of the United States externally and the
changes in the socio-political position of Blacks (and other “minorities”)
internally need to be placed in a larger world context. The pan-European (or
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2006

5

SWB 1,1_f2_6-20

4/12/06

6:44 PM

Page 12

Societies Without Borders, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 1
12 • Immanuel Wallerstein
White) strata had achieved a high point of world dominance in the nineteenth
century. The entire twentieth century was one of reaction to this, involving
increased political assertiveness by the non-European, non-White strata. By
the last quarter of the twentieth century, the decline of the “West” and not
merely that of the United States was becoming a visible phenomenon, and
there is no reason to doubt that this trend will continue and accelerate in the
twenty-ﬁrst century.
There is to be sure resistance to this decline in the pan-European/White
world. U.S. macho unilateral militarism and the Christian right backlash are
two expressions of this resistance, as are similar movements in Europe such
as those led by Jean-Marie LePen in France and Jörg Haider in Austria. What
these movements attack, and indeed quite explicitly, are the Enlightenment
“values” supposedly incarnated in the “American dream.” It is a switch from
the social situation described by Myrdal. He described an America in which
Enlightenment rhetoric was unquestioned but discrimination against Blacks
nonetheless very high because their socio-political power was so low. Sixty
years later, the rhetoric is no longer unchallenged, but the discrimination has
diminished somewhat because the socio-political power of Blacks has increased.
What Myrdal considered to be a great discrepancy between values and
social reality – his American dilemma – has been reduced, as the rhetoric
about the values and the social reality have moved closer to each other.
The political consequence of such a shift is very obvious. In the U.S. of
1944, internal political order was at a very high level. The “dilemma” induced
Americans of the liberal center to push for legal shifts that would “ameliorate”
the dilemma. When however the virtuous rhetoric became less widely accepted
and the real political power of those who are getting the short end of the
stick has increased, there is potentially less order, far less order. The liberal
center has shrunk, almost disappeared, and there has come to be far less room
for legal modes of addressing the issues. We are moving into an active conﬂict
mode, which is what we can foresee as an increasing and fairly immediate
likelihood over the coming decades within the United States, and indeed
within western Europe as well (albeit perhaps less strongly than in the U.S.).
This prospective acute social conﬂict must be placed, too, within a larger
world context. Three separate but interrelated processes are coming together
as the framework within such social conﬂict will be occurring. One is the
structural crisis of the capitalist world-system as an historical system. The
second is the reaction in the collective social psychology of the U.S., a central
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/swb/vol1/iss1/1
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player in this historical system, to the collapse of the “American dream” in
the global arena. The third is the struggle for a new world-system between
the real social forces in contention in the ﬁrst half of the twenty-ﬁrst century.
I have previously argued in some detail why the modern world-system,
which has been in existence for some 500 years, is now in the midst of a
structural crisis, and therefore undergoing a transition to some other kind of
historical system.2 I shall therefore merely resume my argument here quite
brieﬂy. I start with a series of premises. The ﬁrst is that all historical systems
have lives. They have three different moments: (1) the periods of origin; (2)
the long period of its ongoing processes whose cyclical rhythms and secular
trends constantly bring the system back to a (moving) equilibrium and which
can be described as the “normal” mode of operation of the historical system;
and then (c) a structural crisis brought on by the fact that the contradictions
of the system can no longer be contained by its standard mechanisms and
the system, now far from equilibrium, bifurcates. There then ensue chaotic
ﬂuctuations which may be thought of as involving a struggle over which fork
of the bifurcation will be taken and thereby result in a new, reasonably stable,
historical system.
The second premise is one taken from the sciences of complexity.3 The
outcome of a bifurcation is inherently unpredictable. The only thing that is
certain is that the existing system is no longer viable and must disappear.
What will replace it can only be known once it happens. Nor is it certain that
the spatial boundaries of the successor historical system be identical. There
could result a multiplicity of separate historical systems. It is certainly
impossible to assume, as has been widely done within our existing historical
system, that the new system will represent progress, however deﬁned, over
the existing system. It might, but it might not. The premise is that of possible
progress rather than inevitable progress.
The third premise is that during the long period of the “normal” functioning
of an historical system, the ability of actors to affect the functioning of the
system is quite limited. Because the structure, by deﬁnition, contains strong
pressures to return all ﬂuctuations to equilibrium, even enormous social

2
See in particular Utopistics, or Historical Choices of the Twenty-ﬁrst Century, New
York: New Press, 1998, esp. ch. 2.
3
See Ilya Prigogine, The End of Certainty: Time, Chaos, and the Laws of Nature, New
York: Free Press, 1997.
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input (such as those we call political or social “revolutions”) turn out in fact
to have small impact. On the other hand, when the historical system is in
structural crisis, the pressures to return to equilibrium are steeply diminished,
and the reach of the ﬂuctuations is much greater. It follows that small
inputs can therefore have great outputs. We might translate this into standard
philosophical terminology as arguing that “free will” (or agency) triumphs
over “determinism” (or structure) precisely and only in periods of structural
crisis (or systemic transition).
Of course, one needs to explain why the contradictions of the system have
reached a point such that they can no longer be contained and result in a
structural crisis. Abstractly, it is because the outcome of each cyclical rhythm
moves the system along some kind of secular trend or trends, all of which
move towards asymptotes. Therefore when these trends approach the
asymptotes, the system has moved far from equilibrium, becoming unstable
(chaotic), and bifurcating. Let us put concrete ﬂesh on this abstract description.
The capitalist world-economy, which is the form of our existing historical
system, operates on the basic principle of rewarding all actions that permit
and promote the endless accumulation of capital and punishing or limiting
any actions that do not permit and promote this objective.4 How does one
accumulate capital in a capitalist system? The surest way is to produce
commodities for sale on the market, with the lowest possible cost of
production and the highest possible sales price.
The sales price is a function of competition and the size of effective demand.
The amount of competition is determined by the degree to which producers
can create quasi-monopolistic positions, which is a primarily political process.
Monopolies are constantly achieved and then just as constantly self-destruct
over time, a process that translates into the existence of a continually changing
list of “leading products” in the modern world-system.
While the creation of new quasi-monopolies may pose few problems, as
long as there are new products to commodify, keeping costs low is more
difﬁcult. There are three major types of costs of production: recompense for
employees, the use of inputs for production, and payments to multiple state
agencies (taxation) and state agents (corruption). Each of the three costs shows
long-term secular rises (as proportion of the sales price). They seem each to

4
I elaborate this in Historical Capitalism, with Capitalist Civilization, London: Verso,
1995.
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be coming sufﬁciently near to their asymptotes so as to lead to wild ﬂuctuations.
The amount of recompense employers pay their employees (from the lowestpaid to the higher cadres) is a function of the class struggle. The major mode
that employees use to foster increased pay levels is some kind of syndical
action. Successful syndical action is always difﬁcult to organize but two things
work in its long-term favor. On the one hand, whenever the world-economy
as a whole is in an expansionary phase, employers are reluctant to suffer the
production interruptions that hostile syndical action would entail and are
therefore ready to make some concessions to maintain continuous production.
On the other hand, successful syndical action usually reﬂects more sophisticated
political insight by employees and acquisition of tactical knowledge. Both of
these increase in any given locale with the passage of time, and therefore at
some point such syndical action can bear its fruit. In addition, there are
advantages to employers collectively, if not necessarily to the individual
employer in his own ﬁrm, in the expansion of the effective demand for
commodities. And increasing remuneration to employees increases effective
demand in the overall world-economy.
Most employers, however, are primarily concerned with their own shortterm proﬁt levels. When various kinds of repressive techniques fail to stem
employee demands, the employers can resort to physical displacement of the
process of production, provided the reduced costs of production compensate
the costs of change of locale. They can move the enterprise to areas where
employees are ready to accept lower payments and manifest lesser political
sophistication and tactical skill. This is often called the phenomenon of the
“runaway factory.” It has been a standard technique over the last 500 years.
The zone to which production is displaced needs to have a pool of workers
for whom the low remuneration offered is nonetheless higher than their local
alternatives. For the lowest-paid workers, such zones are primarily rural areas
with low involvement in the money economy. The workers in these zones
can be drawn into nearby more urban areas to work in the displaced productive
enterprises. This initially serves the employers well, but over time the new
employees acquire more sophistication and knowledge and begin, in turn, to
engage in syndical action. At this point (perhaps 50 years later), it may be
time to move again. But this kind of repeated displacement presumes the
existence of these pools of potential employees. And the steady deruralization
of the world, itself the result of past displacements, represents the asymptotic
limit to this process.
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2006
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A similar difﬁculty is found in the effort to keep the cost of inputs low.
There are three main mechanisms by which producers keep these costs low.
They do not pay in large part for the costs of detoxiﬁcation. They do not pay
in large part for the costs of renewing the resources they use. And they do
not pay in large part for the creation of the infrastructure they need both for
obtaining their inputs and work force and for marketing their products. This
failure to pay essential parts of the cost of inputs is called the “externalization”
of the costs of production.
But as the deruralization of the world’s work force represents a limit on
keeping the price of labor low, so the ecological damage to the biomass
represents a limit on externalizing detoxiﬁcation and resource replenishment.
In addition, costs of infrastructure rise steadily because of the rising costs of
the work force and lead inevitably to increased taxation. The ecological limits
having become quite visible, green movements of various kinds have become
politically important and have created pressures both for remedial action
(which requires increased taxation) and internalization of these costs (which
also means rising costs of inputs for the producers).
Finally, the costs of external payments (taxes + corruption) have also been
rising steadily as a percentage of the sales price. Taxation has risen because
of the basic democratization of the world politically. The rising political
strength of ordinary people is a function of their collective organization and
militancy, which has led in turn to the states seeking to reduce their militancy
by some limited redistribution of the surplus-value (the “welfare state”). This
had the double advantage of maintaining the political stability of the worldsystem (by appeasing discontent) and expanding effective demand. Still, the
price for this, from the point of view of the individual producer, is a higher
tax bill and therefore lower proﬁts. In addition, the costs of corruption have
been rising as well because here too political sophistication and tactical
knowledge on the part of those extorting the beneﬁts have risen steadily.
It is not that there have not been counter-movements on the part of the
producers to reduce the costs of production. They occur continuously, and
we have seen a large-scale movement of this kind recently. It has been called
“neo-liberalism” (Thatcherism, Reaganism) and dominated the politics of a
number of countries in the last few decades. However, although such countermovements can achieve some reduction of costs, historically they have never
managed to reduce the costs to the previous low point. It is a pattern of two
steps forward, one step backwards, or what might be called a “ratchet” effect.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/swb/vol1/iss1/1
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The bottom line is that the curve of the overall and worldwide costs of production
has been steadily rising. This is the fundamental factor that has produced the
structural crisis of the capitalist world-economy in which we ﬁnd ourselves
today.5
In the midst of this structural crisis, as though by bad timing, occurred the
decline, now rapidly accelerating, of the hegemonic position of the United
States in the existing world-system. It is of course normal for hegemonic
powers to decline. And if the modern world-system were not in structural
crisis, we could limit ourselves to analyzing which are the possible successor
states working to create a new hegemony. But we are indeed in such a structural
crisis, and there is not likely to be any successor hegemonic power before the
system disappears.
Nonetheless, the process of the transition will be affected in important ways
by how the United States reacts to this loss of hegemonic status, a decline
that is only now beginning to dawn on American public opinion. The national
culture of the United States has been founded for almost two centuries on a
strong belief that the United States was “the greatest country in the world” –
a motif that American presidents have repeated endlessly and earnestly. What
is this supposed to mean? Three things really: that the U.S. is the land par
excellence of liberty, and therefore is more “democratic” than any other country;
that the U.S. is more modern, more technologically advanced, and therefore
wealthier than any other country; and (since 1945) that the U.S. has the
strongest military in the world. This trio of features is supposed to be so
obvious and so beneﬁcial to U.S. citizens that very large numbers of persons
elsewhere in the world are anxious to migrate to the U.S. in order to share
in these beneﬁts.
If this description of the U.S. by its leaders and intellectuals could be
considered to be at least plausible in the years 1945–1970, it is becoming
increasingly difﬁcult to defend its plausibility as the twenty-ﬁrst century goes
on, not least of all to the American people themselves. But the consequence
of this shift in plausibility is very great. It has never been easy for any group

5

There is a further, non-economic, element in the process – the apparent success
and then the real failure of the world’s antisystemic movements, which was crystallized
in the world revolution of 1968, has weakened critically the ability of the states to
constrain the strength and volatility of the political action of the popular classes. See
my analysis in After Liberalism, New York: New Press, 1995, Part IV.
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to accept a dramatic deﬂation of their self-image, and it is not at all easy now
for people in the U.S. to do so. They react to this kind of “bad news” in the
usual way people do: with denial, with dismay, with depression, with anger
(even fury). Calm appraisal and rational adjustment are in short supply.
But this brings us back to Myrdal’s American dilemma. If one is not ready
to accept an explanation of decline in terms of objective structural factors,
then the only alternative is to blame someone. And there are only two real
possibilities for this someone: oneself or some “others.” Scapegoats are the
standard product of a situation of social loss. In the case of the United States,
any search for a scapegoat will surely feed into the historic American dilemma,
perhaps leading to pressures to remove even those post-1945 ameliorations
of the position of the Blacks. The rising loud agitation about illegal migration,
aimed primarily at Latin@s coming from the Western Hemisphere, indicates
that this group too will be included such a process of irrational blame.
What is different, however, in the pre-1945 American dilemma and the post2000 American dilemma is two things mainly: The ﬁrst is demography. The
U.S. is no longer dealing with a numerical minority. People of color in the
United States are approaching the 50% mark. And the second is the rapport
de forces. The “people of color” are far better educated, far more politically
sophisticated, far more powerful than they were in the pre-1945 era. And
they are reinforced signiﬁcantly by the fact that the same demographic shift
is occurring at the world level. So, to the degree that the reaction to decline
results in major social scapegoating, which of course can take many forms,
the most obvious result will not be simple repression but a variety of civil
disorder that will be painful, continuing, and extremely difﬁcult to limit.
Of course, one can imagine alternative scenarios, and the surviving liberal
center does imagine them, constantly – scenarios that involve rational discussion
and social compromises. But the strength of the liberal center has been
enormously diminished by the fact that the world-system is in structural
crisis and the United States in decline. So, the liberal center may imagine
these alternatives, but it is far from obvious that they could ﬁnd the political
strength to implement them.
I have thus painted a picture of a terminal and chaotic crisis of the historical
world-system in which we live, and the likelihood of acute disorder not
merely in the less wealthy zones of this world-system but in the zone that
remains the strongest and wealthiest part of the overall system, the United
States. This brings me to an assessment of the overall world struggle in the
coming
20–50 years.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/swb/vol1/iss1/1
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The world struggle is a struggle over the nature of the new historical system
that will replace the present one, which is in structural crisis. There are two
possible kinds of new systems that could emerge. One is a system that is,
like the present one, based on privilege, exploitation, and polarization. It
would not be a capitalist system. It would have different structures, and
different motors, but it would share these social parameters. The alternative
system would be one that would be relatively democratic and relatively
egalitarian. I shall call the two groups in contention the “spirit of Davos” and
the “spirit of Porto Alegre” – with reference to two existing mobilizing
structures, the World Economic Forum that has been meeting in Davos since
1970 and the World Social Forum whose annual meetings commenced at
Porto Alegre in 2001 as a forum designed speciﬁcally to provide an alternative
to that of Davos.
Why should we call them “spirits” and not “forces”? This is because they
reﬂect movements which are worldwide and powerful but which are neither
bureaucratically organized nor internally tightly uniﬁed. Furthermore, these
movements are not at all clear either about their strategy during the transition
or their vision of the structures they wish to erect as the pillars of the
successor system. They are part of the systemic chaos, and are themselves
turbulent and chaotic.
The problem for the forces of Davos is that they are deeply divided between
those who are primarily concerned with their short-term situation (probably
the majority) and those who are concerned with the long-term emergence of
a new viable world-system that will retain the essential of the existing system
but not at all its form and structure. Concern with the short-term and concern
with the long-term lead to very different strategies. And, in addition, to the
extent that the concern with the short-term dominates, the actions taken in
this regard strongly risk compromising the possibilities of success in the longterm strategy. The debate about the U.S. invasion of Iraq is a good instance
of this conﬂict concerning strategy, and the risk that short-term strategies
undermine long-term strategies. The short-term strategy embodied in what
has been called casino capitalism is another good instance of the risk this
poses for long-term strategies.
The problem for those embodying the spirit of Porto Alegre is nonetheless
greater still. Overall, it can be said that they command less disposable money
and less military strength, and are therefore at a tactical disadvantage in any
struggle, at least at the beginning. They also have a heavy legacy of the 150year
historic
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internationals, the national liberation movements – which seemed to be
successful, and in their “success” failed in their fundamental objective of
transforming the system. Furthermore, in the process of failing, the failure
was assessed negatively by the bulk of their own militants and supporters,
who have been trying, ever since the world revolution of 1968, to ﬁnd an
alternative strategy to the state-oriented strategy used by the “Old Left.”6
Indeed the creation of the World Social Forum (WSF) was itself the most
recent attempt to formulate an alternative strategy. It has based itself on a
“horizontalist” approach as opposed to the “verticalist” approach of the Old
Left – an open forum as opposed to a hierarchical, bureaucratic structure,
one that is inclusive rather than based on speciﬁc analyses and sets of
policies (what hostile commentators call their dogmas). What we see today
is that the inclusive structure that is the WSF has been open to the inclusion
of the verticalists, who are contesting from within the horizontalist approach.
Nor is this issue of organizational structure the only thing that divides the
forces of Porto Alegre. For behind this facade lie two bigger questions: One
is the degree to which the strategy is short-term (and therefore inevitably
means various compromises with “centrist” or “reformist” forces) – the same
problem that the forces of Davos face in inverted form – or long-term. But
being oriented to the long-term still leaves open the kind of world-system
into which one wants to emerge. And here there is virtually no consensus at
all. In particular, there is no consensus on how “universalist” is the vision of
the future as opposed to “multicultural.” Nor is that a minor issue that can
be indeﬁnitely postponed.
One can therefore understand quite clearly why there is no way to predict
the outcome of the bifurcation, of the global struggle between those representing
the spirit of Davos and those representing the spirit of Porto Alegre. But it
also makes clear how crucial is the struggle, and therefore how crucial is the
internal debate (and struggle) in each camp. The world is now, over the coming
30–50 years, deciding the contours of social life on the earth over the next
millennium. Caveat emptor.

6
See my analysis of the multiple post-1968 forms of new strategy in “New Revolts
Against the System, New Left Review, 2nd ser., No. 18, Nov./Dec. 2002, 11–29.
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